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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
GREGG v. STATE: AMENDMENTS TO THE DNA POST-
CONVICTION STATUTE APPLY RETROSPECTIVELY, 
REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH THAT POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING COULD PROVIDE 
EXCULPATORY OR MITIGATING EVIDENCE THAT IS 
RELEVANT TO PETITONER'S CONVICTION. 
By: Robyn McQuillen 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, when a petitioner requests post-conviction DNA testing, courts should apply any 
amendments to the Maryland DNA Post-Conviction Statute 
retrospectively. Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009). 
Rather than requiring petitioners to establish that DNA testing was not 
available at the time of their original trial and that the evidence would 
be "materially relevant" to establishing their innocence, the relaxed 
standard of the 2003 amendment to the DNA Post-Conviction Statute 
allows petitioners to seek post-conviction DNA testing if the evidence 
might be exculpatory or mitigating. ld. at 711-12, 976 A.2d at 1006-
07. 
Appellant, Donte Gregg ("Gregg"), was convicted in 2003 of first-
degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in 
the commission of a felony. Epithelial cells were found on the trigger 
of the gun used in the crime, but neither the State nor the defense 
analyzed the cells for DNA identification during Gregg's trial. At 
trial, Gregg asserted that he did not shoot the victim and that his 
physical contact with the murder weapon came from defending 
himself from the actual shooter. 
In 2003, Gregg filed a Petition for DNA Evidence Post-Conviction 
Review, which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed without 
prejudice at the petitioner's request. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed his conviction in 2004. In November 2005, 
without holding a hearing, the circuit court denied Gregg's Motion for 
New Trial and for Release of Evidence for Forensic Testing. Gregg 
then filed a motion for reconsideration and requested a hearing and a 
notice of appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland. Gregg then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to 
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seek the right to file a late appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
which was granted on March 20, 2008. 
In both of the 2003 and 2005 motions, Gregg requested relief under 
the DNA Post-Conviction statute, which is codified in section 8-201 of 
the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code. Gregg, 409 
Md. at 704-05, 707, 976 A.2d at 1002-04 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2008)). This statute was enacted in 2001, and 
amended in 2003 and 2009, to permit persons convicted of serious 
crimes to seek post-conviction DNA testing of evidence that could 
potentially change the outcome of their convictions. Id at 701, 708 
n.5, 976 A.2d at 1000, 1004 n.5. The pertinent statute is section 8-
201 (c), which lists evidentiary requirements the court must find in 
order to permit DNA testing. !d. at 709, 976 A.2d at 1005, (citing MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2008)). Before the 2003 
amendment, the statute listed requirements that the petitioner had to 
establish, including: (1) DNA testing for certain evidence was not 
available or was out of his or her control at the original trial; and (2) 
that there is a reasonable probability that the DNA testing will 
"produce results materially relevant to the petitioner's assertion of 
innocence." Id at 709, 976 A.2d at 1005 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2003)). The 2003 amendment to section 8-
201 (c) requires petitioners to show that the DNA evidence: ( 1) has 
"the potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant 
to a claim of wrongful conviction;" and (2) that a generally accepted 
scientific test is employed to examine the evidence. Id at 711, 976 
A.2d at 1006 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) 
(2008)). 
First, the court decided whether the original version of the statute 
or the 2003 amendment applied to Gregg's petition for post-conviction 
DNA testing. Id at 707, 976 A.2d at 1004. Gregg argued that the 
2003 amendment of section 8-201(c) applied because it was the 
version in effect when his 2005 motion was filed. Gregg, 409 Md. at 
712, 976 A.2d at 1007 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(c) (2008)). According to Gregg, the court was required to allow 
DNA testing of the epithelial cells found on the gun because that 
evidence could show that he was not the shooter and that the actual 
shooter's DNA would be found on the murder weapon. Id at 712,976 
A.2d at 1007. He argued that this evidence would be exculpatory or 
might mitigate other evidence related to his conviction. Id The State 
argued that the original version of section 8-201(c) applied because it 
was the version in effect when Gregg was convicted and when he filed 
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his first motion for post-conviction DNA testing. !d. at 713, 976 A.2d 
at 1007 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2003)). 
According to the State, under the original wording of the statute, the 
court rightfully dismissed Gregg's motion because DNA testing of the 
epithelial cells was available to Gregg at his original trial. !d. Further, 
the State asserted that evidence from DNA testing would not provide 
"materially relevant" information that would necessarily exonerate 
Gregg or implicate someone else in the shooting. !d. at 713-14, 976 
A.2d at 1008. 
In deciding which version of section 8-201(c) applied to Gregg's 
motion for post-conviction DNA testing, the court noted that 
legislative enactments that have a procedural or remedial effect should 
be applied retrospectively. Gregg, 409 Md. at 714, 976 A.2d at 1008 
(citing Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 406-08, 754 A.2d 389, 394-95 
(2000)). The court found that section 8-201 has both a procedural 
effect, by detailing how petitioners are to seek post-conviction DNA 
testing, and a remedial effect, by providing a means for incorrect 
convictions or sentences to be reversed. !d. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008-
09. Therefore, the version of section 8-201 in effect when a petitioner 
files the motion should be applied retrospectively to determine if the 
courts are required to fulfill petitioner's post-conviction DNA testing 
request. !d. at 715-16, 976 A.2d at 1008-09. 
The court found that, because Gregg's 2003 petition for post-
conviction DNA testing was dismissed without prejudice, his 2005 
petition should only have to conform to the requirements of the 2003 
amendments of section 8-201(c). !d. at 716, 976 A.2d at 1009 (citing 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2008)). The court also 
found that Gregg had satisfied the two requirements under the 2003 
amendment of section 8-201(c). !d. at 716-19, 976 A.2d at 1009-11 
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (2008)). The 
presence of another's epithelial cells, while not a guarantee of Gregg's 
guilt or innocence, might provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence 
of Gregg's guilt and conviction. !d. at 716, 976 A.2d at 1009. 
Gregg also argued that the lower court erred in not granting him a 
hearing before dismissing his motion. Gregg, 409 Md. at 712, 976 
A.2d at 1 007. The court did not rule directly on this question because 
it already decided that the lower court ultimately erred in dismissing 
Gregg's 2005 motion. !d. at 721, 976 A.2d at 1012. By reviewing 
two prior cases, however, the court determined that, because of the 
purpose of the statute, a hearing should be held if there is a "genuine 
factual dispute" regarding the evidence. !d. at 717-19, 976 A.2d at 
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1009-11 (citing Arey v. State, 400 Md. at 491, 929 A.2d at 501 (2007); 
Blake v. State, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026 (2006)) (emphasis in 
original). 
This decision bolsters the Legislature's intent that prisoners be 
afforded the opportunity to clear their name through ever-advancing 
forensic technology, which may not have been available at the time of 
their conviction. Additionally, Gregg interprets the application of 
section 8-201(c) of the Criminal Procedure Article and provides that 
an amendment to the statute, which has a procedural and remedial 
effect, must be applied retrospectively to petitions for post-conviction 
DNA testing. Due to the January 2009 amendment of the Post-
Conviction DNA Statute, Maryland petitioners seeking to file a motion 
for post-conviction DNA testing should pay special attention to the 
amendment's relaxed evidentiary requirements. Also, practitioners 
representing a client who is filing a motion under the statute should 
always seek a hearing if there is a genuine factual dispute regarding 
the evidence. 
